A situational approach to the notion of representation
This line of research is focused on a central notion in neuroscience, representation. The word “representation” (as in “neural representation”), and many of its related terms, such as “to represent”, “representational” and the like, play a central explanatory role in neuroscience literature. For instance, in “place cell” literature, place cells are extensively associated with their role in “the representation of space.” However, despite its extended use, we still lack a clear, universal and widely accepted view on what it means for a nervous system to represent something, on what makes a neural activity a representation, and on what is re-presented.
In my previous research, I have shown that the set of properties that are usually assumed in the notion of representation are not useful to understand how brains behave as cognitive systems. The representational scheme based on the idea that neural activity encodes, maps or refers to self-subsistent, meaningful and measurable features of the environment might not be the best way to construe cognitive systems.
There have been authors who have suggested the possibility that cognitive systems might be better understood within a non-representational framework. I have joined this line of enquiry by exploring a specific approach based on the integration of environmental information with the aim of creating a state space where the contingencies of a situation are processed. The basic idea can be summarized as changing the focus on cognitive systems from re-presenting the environment to guiding action through anticipation. In other words, instead of mapping or encoding processes, cognitive systems might be set to control the contingencies of a situation by efficiently integrating environmental, cognitive and motivational information into a processing state ready to guide the individual in that particular situation. In this sense, cognitive systems could be better seen as a system whose function would be that of providing a dynamic state space where “the set of probable events and contingencies” linked to a particular situation could be managed.
Accordingly, instead of re-presenting, a biological cognitive-system would be better described as managing a “situation,” understood as a particular temporal, spatial and meaningful context in which an animal is involved that is set in dynamic framework where past, present and future events are integrated. Hence, cognitive systems would be seen as “situational,” rather than “representational.” The term “situational” has already been used in the sense of a cognitive construction meaningful to the animal only in the situation in which it is involved and probably related to helping the animal to address it. Hence, “situational” may be an appropriate means of labeling this approach.
Vilarroya O. Neural Representation. A Survey-Based Analysis of the Notion. (2017) Front Psychol 8: 1458.
Vilarroya O. (2014). Sensorimotor event: an approach to the dynamic, embodied, and embedded nature of sensorimotor cognition. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7: 912
Vilarroya O. (2013). The Challenges of Neural-Mind Reading Paradigms. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7: 306
Vilarroya, O (2012) A Satisficing and Bricoleur Approach to Sensorimotor Cognition. Biosystems 2012 Nov;110(2):65-73
Vilarroya, O (2013) Introducing Experion as a Primal Cognitive Unit of Neural Processing. In: Vincent C. Müller (ed.) Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics Volume 5. pp: 289-305.
Vilarroya, O (2013) An Experientially-Based Informationless Communication In: Àngels Massip-Bonet and Albert Bastardas-Boada (ed) Complexity Perspectives on Language, Communication and Society. Berlin, Springer (Understanding Complex Systems) pp: 61-73.